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The Right of the Elderly to Self-
Determination and New York's
Legislative Imperative
A. Kathleen Tomlinsont
I. Introduction
In an era when the average life expectancy and the normal
period of physical vitality have increased dramatically,' the law
has become a more important influence during the aging of the
individual human being. Improvements in technology and public
health, as well as shifting demographic trends, have raised en-
tirely new sets of questions for society to confront and resolve.
For the first time in our history, large numbers of older persons
are still alive, active, and vigorous - they have survived the
task of raising the next generation and they are beyond the daily
demands of making a living.2
By the year 2000, 13% of Americans will be aged sixty-five
and over.3 The full impact of the population increase among the
elderly is expected to be felt keenly between the years 2010 and
2030 when the post-World War II baby boom population begins
to retire. At that time, the elderly will comprise an estimated
20% of the total population." Presently, among those individuals
in the general population as a whole, the seventy-five-and-over
age cohort is the fastest growing age segment in the United
t Assistant Dean, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Long Island University.
B.A., magna cum laude, Rutgers University; M.A., with distinction, Long Island Univer-
sity; J.D., St. John's University.
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1. See generally G. BARROW, AGING, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND SOCIETY (3rd ed. 1986).
2. Levine, Introduction: The Frame of Nature, Gerontology, and Law, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 261, 262 (1982).
3. J. KRAUSKOPF, ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING § 1.7 (1st ed. 1983 & Supp. 1984).
4. Senior Citizens in the 1980s: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Services
of the Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 83 (1980) (statement of Norman D.
Shumway, Chairman).
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States.'
Within New York State, there were 2,254,000 persons aged
sixty-five or over in 1985.6 This was 12.7% of the population of
New York State; it has been estimated that in 2010, the figure
will be 15.5%. 7 For example, in Suffolk County presently, it is
estimated that 20% of the population is over age sixty-five.8
"Law is . . . a mechanism through which society adapts its
institutions to the increasing number and proportion of older
Americans." Laws outline how the elderly can retain control of
their property as well as control to whom their property will go
after their death. Yet, property determinations are only one as-
pect of the concerns faced by the elderly. Perhaps the more fun-
damental issue is the effort to preserve the personal autonomy
of elderly persons - a vital concern reflected in the ongoing de-
bates concerning the right to treatment, the right to refuse treat-
ment, and the right to due process for guardianship proceed-
ings. 10 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he law seeks to
preserve the integrity of the autonomy of elderly persons, to
guarantee them fair procedures, and to promote their liberty,
while it also seeks to protect them if their capacities should
fade.""
Therefore, a basic issue in the law which is critically impor-
tant to aging individuals (and to the attorneys who represent
them) is the need to balance autonomy and paternalism. This
Article will address "advance directives" legislation from the
perspective of the autonomy-paternalism tension. It will focus
on the decisionmaking process and on how an individual's lib-
erty is enhanced by such legislation. With the recent tenth anni-
5. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 3, at § 1.7 (1st ed. 1983).
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, at 23 (107th ed. 1986).
7. Telephone interview with New York State Office for the Aging, Research Unit
(Jan. 26, 1988) (figures developed by New York State Dep't of Commerce).
8. Population estimates supplied by the Suffolk County Department of Aging and
the Long Island Regional Planning Board.
9. Levine, supra note 2, at 274. See generally YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, A.B.A. COM-
MISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OP THE ELDERLY AND THE COMMITTEE ON DELIVERY OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO THE ELDERLY, THE LAW AND AGING RESOURCE GUIDE (1981) (discussing the
legal needs of an aging population and the critical areas of interaction between identifi-
able needs of the elderly and available legal services).
10. See generally R. BROWN, THE RIGHTS OF OLDER PERSONS - AN AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK (1979).
11. Levine, supra note 2, at 277.
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versary of the first natural death act, in California,1 2 it is an ap-
propriate time to assess the impact of such legislation which has,
as of this writing, been adopted in some form in thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia."
Advance directives have been given legal recognition in sev-
eral forms, the most common of which are durable power of at-
torney statutes and living will legislation. In reviewing the his-
tory and present status of these devices, this Article will also
address the lack of legally cognizable advance directives in New
York. Rather than focus on the "right to die" controversy, atten-
tion will be directed to the decisionmaking process, particularly
within the framework of the elderly client and his family. Pri-
mary emphasis is given to situations in which the individual
concerned has been competent at some time in his or her life.
The need and accompanying problems of surrogate decisionmak-
ing, the failure of the proposed uniform "Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act,"1' and the inadequacy of the recently enacted New
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1987).
13. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1981); ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010 (1986); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to 82-3804
(Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1987); COLO.
REV. STAT, §§ 15-18-101 to 15-18-113 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to
19a-575 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 to 2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
6-2421 to 6-2430 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to 765.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (1985 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to 327D-27
(Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/, para.
701 to 710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11 to 16-8-22 (Burns Supp.
1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to 144A.11 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-
28, 101 to 65-28, 109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10 (West
Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to 5-604 (Supp. 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121
(Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010 to 459.055 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to 50-9-104, 50-9-201 to 50-9-206 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to
449.690 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to 137-H:16 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-323 (1985); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to 97.090
(1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to 44-77-160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to 32-11-110 (Supp. 1987); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 75-2-1118 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to 54-325.8:13
(Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-1 to 16-30-10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.15 (West Supp.
1987); WYo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to 33-26-152 (Supp. 1985).
14. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (final version of the Act, with a
Prefatory Note and official Comments, was distributed by the National Conference of
3
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York legislation concerning "Orders Not to Resuscitate '15 will
all be examined.
Finally, this Article will urge that the legislature accede to
the judicial pleas of recent Florida and New York cases'6 to es-
tablish a comprehensive bill that formulates clear standards for
resolving requests to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment. It will also urge that such a statute be designed to ensure
the integrity of the medical profession while simultaneously pro-
tecting the right of each individual to self-determination.
II. Background
To deal with the growing number of older citizens who are
living longer, about half the states have implemented "protec-
tive services" legislation. 7 For the present day practitioner, an
awareness of the capacity of elderly clients to make rational de-
cisions and to implement personal choices is essential to arriving
at any judgment of the client's best interests. When that capac-
ity diminishes significantly, the state's inherent parens patriae
power may be invoked to authorize the government to intervene
in a person's life to "promote the ethical principle of benevo-
lence: to protect the person from being harmed and to bestow
upon the individual positive benefits."'" The goal of these ser-
vices is to assist the elderly in maintaining independent living,
particularly in light of the 1970's trend toward deinstitution-
alization. 9
There are few other areas of representation where an attor-
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in Jan., 1986) (available from the National Con-
ference at 645 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 510, Chicago, IL 60611). For a discussion of the
policy considerations and legislative purpose of the UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY
ILL ACT, see Marzen, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act: A Critical Analysis,
1 ISSUES IN LAW AND MEDICINE 441 (1986).
15. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960 to 2978 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (to become ef-
fective Apr. 1, 1988).
16. John F. Kennedy Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983), rev'd, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Saunders, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d
510 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
17. Kapp, Adult Protective Services: The Attorney's Role, 59 FLA. B.J. 23 (1985).
See generally Regan, Protecting the Elderly: The New Paternalism, 32 HASTINGS L.J.
1111 (1981).
18. Kapp, supra note 17.
19. Id.
[Vol. 8:63
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ney is likely to be confronted by such difficult legal issues that
are bound up with intricate questions of ethics and social policy.
This field compels the attorney to "reconcile unresolved per-
sonal values concerning individual liberty or autonomy versus
society's obligations toward the helpless, on the one hand, with
the attorney's traditional role as zealous advocate for the wishes
of the client in an adversarial system on the other hand."20
In light of the tremendous strides medical technology has
made in the last twenty years, the population has become in-
creasingly concerned with decisions about death and dying. In
concert with fundamental changes in the causes of death, signifi-
cant changes in the places where people die have also occurred.
Throughout human history, most deaths by natural causes oc-
curred in the home. However, advances in medicine have con-
currently shifted the locus of health care to institutional set-
tings. "  It has been estimated that in the late 1970's,
approximately 80% of all deaths in the United States occurred
in hospitals and long-term care institutions such as nursing
homes.22
In addition, for the majority of patients, the eventuality of
death is not an unanticipated phenomenon. One study has
shown that in 1978, chronic conditions were the cause of 87% of
all deaths for persons aged sixty-five and over.23 What is of ma-
jor concern, however, is the preservation of the individual's right
to privacy and self-determination within these circumstances.
Courts and legislatures have been increasingly involved in
attempting to clarify the rights, duties, and liabilities of all par-
ties concerned in this decisionmaking process. To re-examine
the way decisions are and should be made concerning an indi-
vidual's right to obtain or forego life-sustaining treatment, the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
20. Id. at 25. Cf. Perlin and Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individ-
uals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982).
21. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 1 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT].
22. Id.
23. Somers, Long-term Care for the Elderly and Disabled: A New Health Priority,
307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221, 222 (1982) (quoting Dorothy P. Rice of the National Center
for Health Statistics).
1988]
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Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research conducted
research among health care professionals and legal and ethical
scholars, in addition to reviewing cases brought in state and fed-
eral courts. The members held public hearings before regional
groups from January 1980 to December 1982. In 1983, the Com-
mission published its findings and recommendations.24
The Commission recommended that "[sitate courts and leg-
islatures should consider making provisions for advance direc-
tives through which people designate others to make health care
decisions on their behalf and/or give instructions about their
care."25 The members saw in these directives a means of pre-
serving self-determination for patients who might lose their
decisionmaking capacity. The Commission noted its preference
for durable power of attorney statutes.
[D]urable power of attorney acts offer a simple, flexible, and
powerful device for making health care decisions on behalf of in-
capacitated patients .... The flexibility of the statutes allows
directives to be drafted that are sensitive both to the different
needs of patients in appointing proxy decisionmakers and to the
range of situations in which decisions may have to be made.26
However, the Commission did add that experience with both du-
rable power of attorney and living will documents in the context
of medical decisionmaking was limited.27
The Commission members indicated a clear preference for
keeping these issues out of an adjudicative forum unless clearly
required by state law.28 However, judicial intervention is also
foreseeable when the parties involved cannot resolve their dis-
agreements "over matters of substantial import."2 9 The Com-
mission concluded that the individual's right to self-determina-
tion is better protected and served when the competent
individual is making his own treatment decisions.3"
24. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 11.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 146-47.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 8:63
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III. Advance Directives: Powers of Attorney
In its report, the President's Commission indicated that an
"advance directive" allows people to anticipate that they may be
unable to participate in future decisions about their own health
care." The report distinguishes between an "instruction direc-
tive," specifying the types of care a person wants or does not
want to receive, and a "proxy directive," specifying the surrogate
whom a person wants to make such decisions if the person is
ever unable to do S0.32 Living wills (including those authorized
by statute) are generally considered "instruction directives."33
Durable power of attorney statutes are characterized as "proxy
directives. 3 4 In some states, the two forms may be combined.3 5
A. Power of Attorney - Common Law and Statutory
Even under the common law, a competent individual has al-
ways had the power by means of a written instrument to author-
ize another person to act in his stead.36 Through this "power of
attorney," the principal designated an agent called the "attor-
ney-in-fact" who could perform any lawful act the principal
might do.3 7 Within this power, two exceptions should be noted:
non-delegable acts including personal services contracts where
the respective act is of such a nature that the service can only be
rendered by a principal, and statutorily mandated personal acts
such as voting, executing a will, and making an affidavit.38 The
power given to an agent by this means is usually broad and is
given to one whom the principal trusts, such as a spouse, adult
child, brother or sister, close friend, or associate.3 9
31. Id. at 136.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 139.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3202 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, §§ 2501 to 2509 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10 (West Supp. 1987).
36. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 144 (1972).
37. Id.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 17 (1958).
39. Id. See Teitler, Contingency Planning for Incapacity, in ADVISING CLIENTS ON
DEALING WITH THE INFIRMITIES OF ADVANCED AGE (Comm. on Continuing Legal Educ. of
the New York State Bar Ass'n 1986).
19881
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A principal can give the attorney-in-fact authorization to
perform many acts - to receive and deposit assets, to sign con-
tracts, to buy and sell real or personal property, to sue or be
sued, to make gifts, to establish trusts, to spend income or prin-
ciple from trusts.4 0 The most common form of power of attorney
in New York is the statutory short form found in General Obli-
gations Law section 5-1501. 4' It authorizes all of the transactions
noted above and provides an additional catch-all category, au-
thorizing the attorney-in-fact to act as an alter-ego of the princi-
pal with respect to any and all possible matters and affairs
which the principal can do through an agent.42
Alternatively, the authority given to the attorney-in-fact
can be cast in narrow terms and can be limited in duration, as is
often the case in a single transaction situation, such as an offer
on specific property.43 A power of attorney can continue indefi-
nitely, however, if no time limit has been stated. Yet, the power
is revoked automatically when a principal is incapacitated.44
Particularly in circumstances affecting the elderly, this au-
tomatic revocation means that the power of attorney disappears
at precisely the time an elderly client might need it
most - when he or she has become incompetent and lacks the
ability to act in his or her own behalf. 45 The durable power of
attorney is a device created with the specific goal of compensat-
ing for this defect. Without such a device, the elderly (and
others in circumstances of incompetency) who have become in-
capacitated would be forced to rely on someone petitioning the
court for appointment of a guardian or conservator to make de-
cisions in their behalf concerning their property or their
person.46
40. OFFICE OF HUMAN DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DURABLE
POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE To GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP,
OR TRUSTEESHIP (1981) [hereinafter DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT
ALTERNATIVE].
41. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987).
42. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-15021(14) (McKinney 1978).
43. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 40, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
[Vol. 8:63
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B. Durable Power of Attorney
Virginia was the first state to enact durable power of attor-
ney legislation, in 1950.47 However, little attention was paid to
the idea until the 1957 National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws appointed a special committee on the
Civil Rights of Persons of Questionable Competency. "s The im-
petus for this investigation was a growing concern for the needs
of an aging population that was (and is) rapidly increasing in
number. In particular, the special committee directed its atten-
tion to persons
unable to care for their property or personal affairs effectively be-
cause of injury, old age, senility, disease, blindness, physical disa-
bility, or mental illness falling short of insanity, and with respect
to whom the laws of most states made no adequate provision for
assistance in caring for their property or personal affairs, or for
protecting their property or personal rights."9
The National Council on Aging, under the provisions of the
Older Americans Act,5 0 and the American Bar Foundation had
been actively studying this problem for several years prior to the
Uniform Commissioners' special committee appointment. 1 After
extensive review of the findings and recommendations of all in-
terested constituencies, the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Law promulgated the Model Special Power
of Attorney for Small Property Interest Act in 1964.52 The
model act was designed to assist persons with smaller income
and property interests, who
in anticipation or because of physical handicap or infirmity re-
sulting from injury, old age, senility, blindness, disease, or other
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (1985).
48. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING, 273 (1964).
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3011 (West 1973).
51. A. KARLSSON, APPOINTING AN AGENT FOR MEDICAL CARE DECISIONS UNDER DURA-
BLE POWER OF ATTORNEY STATUTES 4 (1980) (unpublished manuscript available from
Concern-For Dying, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10107) (citing the report of
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1964).
52. MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT, re-
printed in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HAND-
BOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING - 1964, at 275-81.
19881
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related or similar cause, wish to make provision for the care of
their personal or property rights or interests, or both when unable
adequately to take care of their own affairs."
The model act, in effect, altered the common law rules in its
authorization of specific powers of attorney that would survive a
principal's incapacity.
The Virginia Code of 1950 served as a basis for the durable
power of attorney provisions adopted by the Commissioners and
was incorporated as sections 5-501 and 5-502 of the Uniform
Probate Code. 4 These sections of the Uniform Probate Code
were amended by the Commissioners in 1979 after several states
had reported their experiences with durable power of attorney
statutes. The review and amending process resulted in the pro-
mulgation within that same year of a Uniform Durable Power of
Attorney Act. 55 As of this writing, virtually every state and the
District of Columbia has implemented some form of a durable
power of attorney statute.56 The formulation of the Uniform Du-
53. NATIONAL CONFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 274.
54. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to 5-505 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
55. Karlsson, supra note 51, at 7. Part 5 of Article V of the Uniform Probate Code
was amended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1979. Sections 5-501 to 5-505, as enacted in 1979, are identical to sections 1 to 5 of the
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, also approved by the National Conference in
1979 as an alternative to Part 5 of Article V of the Uniform Probate Code.
56. ALA. CODE § 26-1-2 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.325 to 13.26.330 (1985); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501 to 14-5502 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-501 to 58-511 (1971
& Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2400 to 2407 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
15-14-501 to 15-14-502 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-696 (West 1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 4901 to 4905 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2081 to 21-2082 (Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-6-36 (1982); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 560:5-501 to 560:5-502 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-501 to 15-5-502 (Supp.
1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 30-211-1 to 30-211-7 (Burns Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
633.705 to 633.706 (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-610 to 58-617 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.093 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§
5-501 to 5-502 (1981 & Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601 to 13-602
(1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 201B, §§ 1 to 7 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 700.495 to 700.499 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.5-501 to 524.5-502
(West 1975 & Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 87-3-15 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 486.550
to 486.595 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-5-501 to 72-5-502 (1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-2662 to 30-2663 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.450 to 111.470 (Supp. 1985);
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2B-8 to 46:2B-9 (West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-
501 to 45-5-502 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47-115.1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-30-01 to 30.1-30-05 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1337.01 to 1337.091 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
58, §§ 1051 to 1062 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 126.407 to 126.413 (1985); PA.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/2
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rable Power of Attorney Act was a revolutionary change that
gives individuals the ability to select whom they want to make
decisions on their own behalf in the event they become incompe-
tent or incapable of managing their own affairs.5 7 These statutes
permit a significant degree of particularity, not only in terms of
decisions affecting the management of a person's property, but
in some states affecting the making of health care decisions as
well. 8
The Uniform Commissioners provided a report enumerating
some of the purposes of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney
Act and provided some guidance as to its uses. They noted that
the Act might be a substitute for persons who would otherwise
set up a funded revocable trust, and that a durable power could
be used as an alternative to court-oriented protective procedures
such as conservatorship and guardianship.5" However, there has
been ongoing controversy concerning the use of durable power of
attorney legislation to make health care decisions. Some state
statutes authorize such use; others do not.6 0 The courts have
continued to look to the statutes and legislatures for guidance in
this area.
Only those powers which come within the statutory require-
ments are durable. Although there is no one form required for a
valid durable power of attorney, the power must be in writing
and must include an express provision that the power survives
any subsequent incompetence of the principal. 1 In some states,
the provision may state that the power takes effect upon the in-
competence of the principal (the so-called "springing powers"). 2"
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5601 to 5602 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-22-
6 to 34-22-6.1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-501 to 62-5-502 (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 59-7-2.1 to 59-7-2.4 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-5-104 to 66-5-
105 (1982); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-501 to
75-5-502 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3051 to 3052 (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§
11-9.1 to 11-9.4 (1985 & Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.94.010 to 11.94.900
(1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 39-4-1 to 39-4-7 (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 243.07 (West
1987).
57. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 40, at 3.
58. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1987).
59. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 40, at 4.
See also J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 3, at § 6.10 (1st ed. 1983).
60. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE, supra note 40, at 5.
61. Karlsson, supra note 51, at 5-6.
62. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501 to 14-5502 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
1988]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
Some commentators do not believe that New York recognizes
such a springing power.6 3
The formalities and requirements concerning persons who
may act as attorney-in-fact under a durable power differ from
state to state. In Connecticut, a durable power must be acknowl-
edged by the principal and two witnesses who must attest to the
principal's signature.6 South Carolina requires that the durable
power be executed with the formality of a will before three wit-
nesses and be recorded as a deed. 5 In Florida, the class of peo-
ple who may serve as agents under a durable power is limited to
the principal's family members, namely, "spouse, parent, child,
whether natural or adopted, brother, sister, niece or nephew
",66
The California Legislature, in 1979, enacted its first version
of a durable power of attorney as an alternative to a conserva-
torship proceeding or a revocable living trust. 7 In this enact-
ment, the legislature set a one-year limit on duration of the
power once the principal became incapacitated. It thereby in-
tended "to limit the opportunity for unscrupulous parties to
gain absolute control over the assets of the incapacitated princi-
pal."' " Subsequently, in 1981, the California Legislature passed
the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, superseding the
1979 Act, and consequently removed the one-year limitation of
that Act. 9
The Michigan statutory provision does not contain any re-
15-14-501 to 15-14-502 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901 to 4902 (1987).
However, a springing power requires some mechanism for making the determination of
incompetency and for deciding when the power actually takes effect. J. KRAUSKOPF,
supra note 3, at § 6.15 (1st ed. 1983).
63. Schlesinger, Use of Powers of Attorneys and Joint Bank Accounts in Planning
for the Management of the Property of the Aging or Incapacitated Client, in ESTATE
PLANNING FOR THE AGING OR INCAPACITATED CLIENT 112 (D.P. Callahan & P.J. Strauss
eds. 1986).
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69 and 47-5 (West 1987).
65. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-13-10 (1986).
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1987).
67. CAL. Clv. CODE § 2307.1 (repealed 1981) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE §
2400 (West Supp. 1987).
68. Comment, Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation; Administration of
Estates, 11 PAC. L.J. 271, 303 (1980).
69. Dickman, Court Enforcement of a Durable Power of Attorney, 17 U.S.F. L. REV.
611, 616-17 (1983).
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striction on the subject matter suitable for delegation under a
durable power of attorney.70 Although the rules as to what can
or cannot be delegated are not well developed, the formal re-
quirements for execution are clear. The durable power must be
in writing and contain the words, "[tihis power of attorney shall
not be affected by the disability of the principal .... "71 The
statute "recommends" attestation by two competent witnesses
and further states that the instrument should contain a jurat or
authentication and be sealed by a notary public.7 2
Given the provisions of many state durable power of attor-
ney statutes, several commentators have stated that these laws
provide a legal device which might be used to appoint an agent
to make medical care decisions in the future on an individual's
behalf in the event of incompetency. 73 In Michigan, one member
of the Bar Commission studying this issue noted:
Based on the precedents of other jurisdictions, it seems likely
that a properly drafted Durable Power of Attorney can be used to
authorize an attorney-in-fact not only to assist in the manage-
ment of the principal's assets, but also to provide for the care,
custody, and control of the incompetent, and can even be utilized
to authorize an attorney-in-fact to refuse to consent to various
kinds of medical treatment. In addition, it would be highly desir-
able to have the principal make his/her wishes concerning medi-
cal treatment known in a clear and unambiguous way. An instruc-
tive directive, such as the Living Will, which specifies the type of
care a person wants or does not want to receive, would be a very
advantageous adjunct to the Durable Power of Attorney.7 4
New York provides that a power of attorney may survive
the possible mental or physical disability of the maker in the
future.75 However, even though a durable power of attorney ex-
tends to the attorney-in-fact the right to make decisions con-
cerning financial and personal affairs, there remains a very large
question about health care decisions. Even with the combined
70. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.495 (West 1980).
71. Id.
72. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.631 (West 1967).
73. A. KARLSSON, supra note 51, at 6; Bos, The Durable Power of Attorney, 64 MICH.
B.J. 694-95 (1985).
74. Bos, supra note 73, at 695.
75. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1978).
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use of a living will and a durable power of attorney," the attor-
ney-in-fact must still obtain court approval for terminating the
life-sustaining treatment of a principal who has previously indi-
cated such desire.77 Such a process is both time-consuming and
expensive.
Generally, in New York, a power of attorney will not be an
available alternative for one who is already incompetent and
whose only option in such a case would be a committeeship or
conservatorship. "The advent of the durable power solves a ma-
jor shortcoming of powers that previously existed because a du-
rable power survives incapacity and provides an informal and
inexpensive alternative to committeeship or conservatorship.""8
In New York, a power, to be durable, must be in writing and
must contain the words: "This power of attorney shall not be
affected by the subsequent disability or incompetence of the
principal . . . .,,' The signature of the principal must be ac-
knowledged by a notary public8 0
Although the courts have not specifically ruled on this ques-
tion, legal practitioners appear split on the interpretation of the
durable power of attorney statutes to include the power to con-
sent to medical treatment. For example, in South Carolina, two
attorneys noted:
The durable power can contain provisions relating not only
to asset management, but also to the care, custody, and control of
the incompetent .... A power of attorney dealing with the cus-
tody of the person should cover such matters as the establishment
of the incompetent's place of residence, including the specific lo-
cation, city, county, and state, and it may also include establish-
ing that residence at a nursing or convalescent home. The power
can also permit the attorney in fact to retain and dismiss a vari-
ety of professional help (medical, legal, accounting) and to con-
sent to those kinds of medical or surgical treatment and proce-
dures for which consent is required."
76. Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
77. Kramer, The Professional's Role in Helping the Client and the Family Deal
with Death, 58 N.Y. ST. B.J. no. 2 at 26 (1986).
78. Schlesinger, Personal Planning for the Elderly Client, 59 N.Y. ST. B.J. no. I at
16 (1987).
79. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1601 (McKinney 1978).
80. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1987).
81. Moses & Pope, Estate Planning, Disability, and the Durable Power of Attor-
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It is also worth noting that in the early days of the durable
power of attorney statutes, the American Bar Association con-
ducted an informal poll of physicians, hospitals, and medical
care providers and found that "they would accept . . . [durable
powers of attorney] . . . not only as to personal care, but as to
their contractual relationship with" the patient.82
However, in 1984, the New York State Attorney General is-
sued a formal opinion 83 which held that in New York, durable
powers of attorney may not "generally" be used for health care
decisions. The opinion notes in part:
[W]e believe that a durable power of attorney cannot with pru-
dence be used to delegate generally to an agent the authority to
make health care decisions on behalf of an incompetent principal
... . However, it is our opinion that a durable and properly lim-
ited power of attorney may be used to delegate specifically to an
agent the responsibility to communicate the principal's decision
to decline medical treatment under defined circumstances.8 4
In addition, a member of the Trusts and Estates section of the
New York Bar recently conducted an informal telephone survey
of several New York City hospitals and found that the adminis-
trative policies at these institutions demonstrate an unwilling-
ness to honor durable power of attorney documents for health
care decisions and that enforcement will require a court order.8"
To cope with these difficult circumstances, California
adopted a durable power of attorney for health care,86 effective
January 1, 1984. The statutory power is valid for seven years
after execution. No cases have yet been .brought under this
legislation.8 7
The durable power of attorney does possess certain advan-
tages, particularly in comparison to guardianship. It allows the
ney, 30 S.C.L. REV. 511, 528 (1979).
82. Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm - the Durable Power of Attor-
ney - Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
1, 4 (1978).
83. 1984 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 16.
84. Id.
85. Schlesinger, supra note 78, at 19.
86. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 2430 to 2444 (West Supp. 1987).
87. Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(1986) (hearing denied) was brought under other statutory provisions.
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client more autonomy since the client is free to terminate the
power at any time, as long as he has capacity.88 The client can
also decide, while still having capacity, who will have responsi-
bility over his affairs. 9 The durable power is less expensive to
execute than guardianship proceedings.90 Guardianship also re-
quires automatic supervision of the client and the client's affairs
usually by a guardian - virtually eliminating any sense of indi-
vidual autonomy.9' The real question, then, is whether the dura-
ble power of attorney is a strong enough instrument to allow
such medical planning as the discontinuance of life-support and
life-sustaining measures. This issue will be assessed once the
correlative issue, living wills, has been discussed.
IV. Advance Directives: Living Wills
A. History and Legislative Intent
Living wills are signed documents in which a person re-
quests that his life not be unnecessarily prolonged if he becomes
terminally ill. 2 This advance directive has medical, legal, and
ethical dimensions. Its existence depends upon certain ethical
principles regarding human rights, including the right to a qual-
ity of life that goes beyond mere physical duration.
Initially, living wills were developed as documents without
any binding legal effects; they were ordinarily considered "in-
struction directives." 93 The primary thrust behind the introduc-
tion of natural death act legislation was the desire to give legal
recognition to living wills. These documents enable individuals
to indicate their preference not to be given heroic or extraordi-
nary treatments.
The living will has two important functions. First, by clearly
indicating the patient's preferences regarding certain medical
88. McKay, New Types of Protective Services, 8 GENERATIONS No. 8 at 11 (1984).
89. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 3, at § 6.13 (1st ed. 1983).
90. Id. at § 6.1.
91. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-303, 8 U.L.A. 463 (1982). See generally Alexander, Pre-
mature Probate: A Different Perspective on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 1003 (1979).
92. CONCERN FOR DYING, THE LIVING WILL AND OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, A LEGAL
GUIDE TO MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISIONS 5 (1986) [hereinafter THE LIVING WILL AND
OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES].
93. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 139.
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procedures or measures, the will guides treatment decisions made
by the family and health care providers. This ensures respect for
patient autonomy even when the patient is no longer competent.
Second, the will provides documentation of the patient's instruc-
tions regarding withholding or withdrawing of certain life-pro-
longing or life-sustaining technology. This protects health care
providers and institutions that follow the patient's directives."
As of this writing, thirty-eight states and the District of Co-
lumbia have passed legislation detailing the legal rights of indi-
viduals who execute living wills.9 5 In the absence of specific liv-
ing will legislation, proponents of these documents and a
number of courts find a legal basis for them in the common
law. 96 These fundamental legal rights include the common law
right to self-determination and the constitutional right to
privacy. 7
One of the best known commentators concerning the law as
it affects the elderly, Robert Brown, has noted that although
natural death directives and living wills are similar in purpose
and content, there is a significant difference between the two. 8
In some states where living wills are not legally binding, natural
death directives have been expressly authorized by legislatures 9
and are therefore binding upon patients, doctors, and hospitals
in those states. However, no natural death act now in force deals
with all the possible issues to be raised when living wills are
used without any particular statutory sanction. '00 On the other
hand, where living will legislation is binding, penalties are im-
posed on physicians and health care providers who refuse to act
in accordance with stated living will provisions (such as transfer-
94. THE LIVING WILL AND OTHER ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, supra note 92, at 5.
95. For a list of statutes, see supra note 13.
96. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to com-
pel a personal injury plaintiff to undergo pretrial medical examination); Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (recognizing the
individual's strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasions of his bodily
integrity).
97. Comment, Natural Death Legislation in Illinois - The Illinois Living Will
Act, 1984 So. ILL. U.L.J. 465, 468 (1984). See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (the term "liberty" as used in the fourteenth amendment in-
cludes "the freedom to care for one's health and person").
98. R. BROWN, supra note 10, at 339.
99. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 141.
100. Id.
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ring the patient to a doctor who will comply with the patient's
directives). 101
Rather than defining the exact scope of a patient's rights (a
topic outside the limitations of this Article), the purpose here is
to indicate the status of current common law and statutory ef-
forts to protect a patient's rights. Within that framework, it is
necessary to address these rights when a patient is competent, as
well as to discuss the problems which arise in attempting to sus-
tain those rights when the individual becomes incapacitated.
The law is well established that competent adult patients
have the right to determine medical treatment given to them.
The doctrine of informed consent means that a physician may
not treat a patient until he has disclosed and explained the risks
and material facts concerning the treatment and thereafter has
secured his patient's consent. 102 This right to decide on one's
own medical treatment is based on the common law right of
bodily self-determination'0 3 and the constitutional right of pri-
vacy which encompasses the right to refuse medical
treatment.'0 '
In 1914, Justice Cardozo took the argument one step further
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."0 5
No fundamental right is absolute, and the state in fact re-
tains certain bedrock interests in medical decisionmaking.'0 6
101. Id.
102. R. BROWN, supra note 10, at 329.
103. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 130, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1980); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647 (1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 213 (1973).
105. Schloendorfj, 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
106. For a discussion of the state's fundamental interests in medical decisions and
the individual's right to refuse treatment, see Note, In re Conroy: A Limited Right to
Withhold or Withdraw Artificial Nourishment, 6 PACE L. REV. 219, 224 n.23 (1986) (dis-
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The state's interest in preserving life is considered the most sig-
nificant. 10 7 However, no state interest has ever been held by an
appellate court to outweigh a competent patient's right to refuse
treatment - unless such refusal would endanger the life of an
innocent third party. With the exception of Arkansas and Idaho,
the states that have passed living will/natural death acts have
incorporated provisions excluding pregnant women from exercis-
ing the right to forego treatment during the pregnancy.0 '
Clearly, the Karen Ann Quinlan case1 9 served as the strong-
est impetus for this type of legislation under the aegis of the
constitutional right to privacy. In commenting on this case and
the initial opposition to living will-type legislation, Lawrence
Tribe has noted:
There may nonetheless be grounds to suspect that those seeking
to secure their own rights to execute "living wills" are at a disad-
vantage in the political process, in part because the issue is one to
which most people will be indifferent (or which they will deliber-
ately avoid) until they are hardly in a position to be politically
active, and in part because highly organized opposition groups
may regard the issue as inseparable from such questions as
abortion. 1
The organized opposition of which Tribe speaks has since dra-
matically diminished, primarily as a result of rulings that fol-
lowed the Quinlan case in other jurisdictions. Some of these rul-
ings ironically caused major opponents of living will legislation
from organized religious groups to recant their positions."'
However, the positions taken by organized churches are becom-
ing more narrowly defined as the term "living will" is further
distinguished from other advance directives, such as the do-not-
resuscitate orders. These will be discussed below in the context
cussing Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)).
107. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
108. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
H:14(1) (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (Supp. 1987).
109. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
110. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 937 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
111. See Paris & McCormick, Living Will Legislation Reconsidered, AMERICA, Sept.
5, 1981, at 86-87.
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of more recent acts and decisions.'1 2
The right of an individual to refuse to be touched or treated
in any manner protects an individual from coercive acts. The
growing number of United States Supreme Court decisions de-
lineating an individual's right of privacy has provided a basis for
court decisions not to intervene in the termination of life-sus-
taining treatment or not to prevent such termination." 3 The Su-
preme Court has consistently recognized the existence of a right
of privacy (though not an express right), deriving that right from
several sources, including the "penumbra" of the first, fourth,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.'
Each state with living will legislation generally provides a
definition of key terms used in its natural death laws." 5 In virtu-
ally every opening statement of legislative intent, each state has
recognized that adult persons have the fundamental right to
control decisions relating to their own medical care, including
the right to make a written directive or declaration instructing
their physicians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining proce-
dures in the event of a terminal condition."1 Generally, life-sus-
taining procedures or mechanisms are defined to include any
medical treatment, procedure, or intervention which uses
mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or sup-
plant a spontaneous vital function.1
The provisions of each of the thirty-nine laws in existence
at this writing establish that a legal document is being executed.
The declarant states that he or she is of sound mind and that
the declaration is being made voluntarily." 8 Procedurally, many
states require the elements of execution identical to those for
112. See infra text accompanying notes 195-198, 278, 295-296.
113. See generally Martyn & Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Termi-
nally Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779 (1984);
Comment, Right to Die: Procedure for the Exercise of the Terminally Ill Incompetent
Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 719 (1984).
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
115. See Note, Natural Death Legislation in Illinois, supra note 97, at 465 n.2.
116. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:1 (Supp. 1987).
117. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16 § 2501(d) (1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1987).
118. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3
(Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1987).
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testamentary documents: the living will must be signed and wit-
nessed." 9 In only two states is an oral declaration, properly wit-
nessed, acceptable. 12 0 All of the states require at least two adult
witnesses (three in South Carolina) and in the majority of states,
these witnesses may not be any individual who has an interest in
the declarant's estate, anyone related by blood or marriage to
the declarant, or anyone who may have a claim against the es-
tate.1"1 Although it is impossible to list all of the legislative dif-
ferences, a brief review of several variables in living will legisla-
tion can provide a perspective of the consequences at issue.
In a number of states, only one attending physician is re-
quired to diagnose a patient's condition as terminal.'22 In Mary-
land, "'23 two physicians must make the certification; in Missis-
sippi," " the diagnosis of a terminal condition by the attending
physician must be verified by two other physicians. The majority
of states require the declarant to be a competent adult. 2 5 One of
the few universal provisions is that living wills are revocable.12 1
In Virginia 12 7 and Louisiana, 2 8 the statutes outline a nonju-
dicial procedure authorizing another person to make a declara-
tion on behalf of an incompetent patient who has not made a
previous declaration. Louisiana permits a spouse, parent, sibling,
adult child of the patient, or a judicially appointed surrogate to
make a declaration on a patient's behalf if he is comatose or un-
able to communicate.'29 Two physicians must further certify
119. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(A) (1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-
1l(b)(3), (5) (Burns Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3103(A) (West Supp. 1987);
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h(3)(a) (Supp. 1987).
120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(2) (West Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-
325.8:3 (Supp. 1987).
121. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(b)(1) to
(3) (1983).
122. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 701 to 710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
123. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-602(c) (Supp. 1987).
124. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121 (Supp. 1986).
125. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.3
(West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2922 (Supp. 1987).
126. See Kite, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 99 (1982).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1987).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1987).
129. Id. § 40:1299.58.5(A)(2).
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that the patient has a terminal and irreversible condition. 3 ' In
California 131 and Georgia, 132 the declaration expires after a
stated period and must be reexecuted.
About one-third of the states make legal provisions for fines
and imprisonment or other sanctions in the case of physicians
who do not adhere to the patient's rights as set forth in its living
will legislation. 13 3 One of the newer provisions concerning the
elderly in nursing homes or long term care facilities mandates
the co-signing of a declaration by the institutional ombudsman
as well as two other qualified witnesses.' One major drawback
in this legislation is that only two states, Maine135 and Mary-
land, 36 specifically recognize living will documents executed out
of state. In all other states, if an individual becomes comatose or
incompetent in a state other than the one in which the living
will was executed, the sister state has no obligation to give force
and effect to the declaration.
Unlike the California statute which has been characterized
as representing "a form of unwarranted paternalism,' 1 37 the
Louisiana Natural Death Act permits a person to prepare a dec-
laration at any time.13 The directive is valid and does not re-
quire a waiting period.' 39 Louisiana followed the lead of Dela-
ware 4 ° by providing for the appointment of a surrogate
decisionmaker if the declarant becomes incompetent."' This as-
pect of living will legislation is perhaps more critical than any
other component in dealing with the elderly.
Louisiana's natural death act, while relying on the Model
Medical Treatment Decision Act, avoids many of the pitfalls of
130. Id. § 40:1299.58.3(C)(1).
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1987).
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6 (1985).
133. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11 to 16-8-22 (Burns Supp. 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2928 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108 (Supp. 1987).
134. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2432(f) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2423
(Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2506(c) (1983).
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2930 (Supp. 1987).
136. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-612(b) (Supp. 1987).
137. Vitiello, Louisiana's Natural Death Act and Dilemmas in Medical Ethics, 46
LA. L. REV. 259, 272 (1985).
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(A) (West Supp. 1987).
139. Id.
140. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983).
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3(c) (West Supp. 1987).
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the earlier acts .... Louisiana recognizes the right of self-deter-
mination when an individual is not faced with a diagnosis of ter-
minal illness. In place of a waiting period, the Louisiana act
makes the revocation of an advance directive extremely easy. The
Act also gives express recognition of the right of a competent
adult to make an oral declaration when so incapacitated that he
cannot prepare a written document. The required formalities
limit the possibility that a patient will refuse painful treatment in
a moment of stress.142
The major weakness in this type of legislation is the fact that
natural death acts are not drafted to encompass every poten-
tially complicated situation. Courts will, of necessity, continue
their struggle to strike a balance between a right to refuse medi-
cal treatment and ethical prohibitions against euthanasia.
When statutory language becomes narrowly restrictive, it is
virtually inapplicable. The Executive Director of the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical Research noted early on that "[tihe intent of these
statutes is simple ... [to] mak[e] Living Wills legally binding
documents. Yet the resulting statutes are, in my view, so cum-
bersome and restrictive as to be useless at best, and possibly
very mischievous. 11 4 3 As outlined in the provisions noted above,
Louisiana's natural death act is perhaps the most comprehensive
legislation yet passed in this area.
B. Problems of Incompetency
In the context of foregoing life-sustaining treatment for in-
competent patients, most courts that have addressed the issue
have explicitly stated that patients do not lose their constitu-
tional or common law rights by virtue of incompetency. 44 Al-
142. Vitiello, supra note 137, at 275.
143. Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Dimensions in Framing Law
on Life-Sustaining Treatment, ARIz. STAT. LJ. 647, 652 (1985).
144. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 n.92 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (asserting that "absent an emergency, the physician must
obtain the necessary authority from a relative" before treating an incapacitated patient);
Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 835 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff 'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.
1974), reh'g denied, 496 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974) (phy-
sician's conveying of information to patient's wife does not obviate his duty to seek in-
formed consent of the patient-husband); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (recognizing strong interest of a person in being
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though the right of privacy has not been expanded to read the
"right to die," the right to refuse medical treatment has been
extended to incompetent patients in many states,'45 but that
right must be exercised by a representative on the incompetent's
behalf.
In two states,'46 the living will/natural death acts have es-
tablished a list of relatives who have the power to give substi-
tuted consent. Unfortunately, in the majority of states, there are
no statutes stipulating who can give consent for an incapacitated
patient.
The President's Commission, along with many courts, has
recognized that family members are usually appropriate surro-
gate decisionmakers. The Commission observed that "[iun [its]
view, the cumbersomeness and costs of legal guardianship
strongly militate against its use and ought to be taken into ac-
count by lawmakers before they require that decisions about
life-sustaining treatment be made by judicially appointed guard-
ians. ''14  The Commission also suggested that courts are ill-
equipped to assume the role of substitute decisionmaker. 14 8
The courts have leaned upon common law doctrine to estab-
lish standards for cases dealing with incompetent patients. The
two standards that have traditionally been used to guide deci-
sionmaking for incompetent patients are the best interests stan-
dard and the substituted judgment standard. 1"9 The best inter-
free from nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity as a basis for the interest of the
individual in refusing medical treatment); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980) (based upon the constitutional right of privacy, husband
could assert any constitutional right to which wife was entitled concerning termination of
life support systems); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983) (over-
ruled on other grounds); In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (recognizing
common-law right to be free from bodily invasion as alternative basis for the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223
(1985) (noting that the right to decline medical treatment is embraced within the com-
mon-law right of a person to control his own body).
145. See, e.g., Severns, 421 A.2d at 1347; Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68
Ohio Misc. 1, 12, 426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (1980); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376-79, 420
N.E.2d at 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-74.
146. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3803 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5
(A)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
147. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 131.
148. Id. at 126-32.
149. Id. at 132-36.
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ests standard is an objective test which seeks to determine what
would be most beneficial to the patient "according to societally
shared criteria."'150 More commonly used is the substituted judg-
ment standard, where the decisionmaker attempts to reach the
decision the patient would reach if he or she were able to de-
cide.'51 The goal is to preserve the right of self-determination to
the extent possible, considering that the patient is incapable of
making a contemporaneous decision. 52 While cases have grown
in number, this is still an unsettled area of law. In reviewing
some of these cases, this Article now focuses on those in which
the interests of elderly patients have been at stake.
In Lane v. Candura,53 the Massachusetts appeals court
held that the irrationality of a patient's decision not to submit
to surgical amputation of her leg - a decision which would re-
sult in her death - did not justify the conclusion that the pa-
tient's capacity to make a decision was impaired to the point of
legal incompetence. Mrs. Candura was a seventy-seven-year-old
widow, a diabetic suffering from gangrene in the right foot and
lower leg. She had been depressed since losing her husband two
years earlier and had already undergone two smaller amputa-
tions for a toe and part of her foot. Prior to the medical circum-
stances of the case, she had stated her belief that the operation
would not cure her and she did not wish to live as an invalid in a
nursing home. 1 5 The court noted that her competence was not
questioned until she changed her original decision and withdrew
her consent to the amputation. 55 Noting that Mrs. Candura had
no obligation to agree with her doctors, but only to make an in-
formed decision, the appeals court upheld her right to refuse the
operation, knowing full well the consequences. 56
The Ohio County Court of Common Pleas held in Leach v.
Akron General Medical Center 57 that the constitutional right
150. See Simpson, Living Wills: A Matter of Life and Death, 125 TRUSTS & Es-
TATES 10, 12.
151. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 132.
152. Id. at 132-33.
153. 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 -(1978).
154. Id. at 381, 376 N.E.2d at 1234.
155. Id. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1235,
156. Id. at 385, 376 N.E.2d at 1236.
157. 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
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to privacy guarantees the right of a terminally ill and perma-
nently semicomatose person to decide his or her own treatment
and that an order authorizing discontinuation of a respirator
sustaining the life of a seventy-seven-year-old patient was ap-
propriate in recognition of those rights.158
Neither the Ohio Supreme Court nor the Ohio General As-
sembly has yet spoken on the topic of life-support systems or
the right of a terminally ill patient to determine his own choice
of treatment or refusal of treatment, although legislation has
been introduced into the Ohio Assembly and various groups
have urged its adoption."5 9 Mrs. Leach was suffering from Lou
Gehrig's disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) and had been
hospitalized, during which time she experienced cardiac arrest.
Although physicians revived her, her condition warranted place-
ment on a life-support system. After she had lapsed into a
chronic vegetative state, her husband sought and received ap-
pointment as her guardian. He then brought an action to discon-
tinue his wife's life-support system. 60
The weakness in Leach, as one reviewer has noted, is that it
is a trial court decision and therefore is not binding precedent
on any court in Ohio. 6' In addition, the case addresses only the
rights of a limited class of patients who are either terminally ill,
comatose, or maintained on life-support systems.' The ques-
tion of patient treatment options before life-supports are ap-
plied is still unresolved.
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that where
family members were available, some member of the family may
become the surrogate decisionmaker for the incompetent pa-
tient - without prior court appointment as guardian.'63 Where
no family members exist, a court-appointed guardian would be
necessary. 6 4 The court adopted the view that life-sustaining
treatment could be withdrawn where a court or guardian found
158. Id.
159. Note, Toward an Ohio Natural Death Act: The Need for Living Will Legisla-
tion, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 1019, 1032 (1985).
160. Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 2-3, 426 N.E.2d at 810-11.
161. Note, supra note 159, at 1021.
162. Id.
163. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
164. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
[Vol. 8:63
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss1/2
RIGHT OF THE ELDERLY
that the patient would choose to have treatment discontinued if
competent, and at least three physicians concurred in the opin-
ion that the patient's condition was incurable and that there was
no reasonable medical probability of a return to a cognitive, sa-
pient state.'65 In other nonfamily situations, no judicial approval
would be needed, provided a hospital prognosis committee unan-
imously concurred in a decision to withdraw such treatment. 16
There are only a few cases in which the validity and en-
forceability of living wills have actually been litigated. One re-
cent case, In re Saunders, will be discussed in another section.' 67
However, in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Blud-
worth,6 8 the Supreme Court of Florida in 1984 held that an in-
competent's duly executed five-year-old living will could be per-
suasive evidence of his wishes and should be given great weight
by those who held the decisionmaking reins.' The court au-
thorized the termination of life-support systems and held that
the right to forego such treatment could be exercised by a family
member or a guardian appointed by the court."' The court fur-
ther explained that incompetent persons being sustained
through the use of extraordinary artificial means have the same
right to refuse to be held on the threshhold of death as termi-
nally ill competent patients.17 '
In In re Hier, 1 2 a Massachusetts appeals court authorized
drug therapy for an incompetent patient. However, the court
would not authorize a highly intrusive surgical procedure needed
to provide adequate nutrition.' 71 Mary Hier was ninety-two
years old and had a long history of severe mental illness that
had kept her in a psychiatric hospital for fifty-seven years. The
court ruled that a temporary guardian should be appointed with
power to authorize the drug therapy. The guardian would not
have authority, however, to consent to surgical procedures re-
165. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750-51.
166. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 819-21, 689 P.2d at 1378.
167. 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1985). See infra notes 214-221.
168. 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
169. Id. at 620.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 614-15.
172. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959, review denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465
N.E.2d 261 (1984).
173. Id. at 208, 464 N.E.2d at 964.
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quired for her to receive adequate nutrition.1 7 Applying a sub-
stituted judgment analysis,175 the court found that the patient's
circumstances indicated she would not consent to surgical treat-
ment if she were competent.176
Mrs. Hier had been receiving nutrition by means of a feed-
ing tube surgically implanted into her stomach through her ab-
dominal wall, but she had repeatedly pulled out the tube.1 77 She
had refused to consent to reinsertion of the tube which would
have necessitated a highly intrusive procedure, one which the
court concluded would be "onerous and burdensome. '178 In ad-
dition, the court found no third parties whose interests required
protection, nor did it find any state interest in the preservation
of life which was strong enough to overcome the patient's
wishes, indicating that the treatment would only extend her
suffering.1 79
A New Jersey case which has generated a great deal of at-
tention may indicate another direction evolving law may take.1 80
In In re Conroy,"'1 one of the key points the court considered
was the type of treatment sought to be withdrawn - in this
case, nourishment through a nasogastric tube.
Mrs. Conroy was eighty-four years old, incompetent, and
suffering from heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, and a gan-
grenous leg. The doctors expected her death to occur within a
year. Her nephew, who had previously been appointed her
guardian, sought the removal of the feeding tube. The trial court
granted the nephew's petition and permitted the removal of the
feeding tube.18 2 However, the intermediate appellate court re-
versed, on the grounds that the right to terminate treatment in
New Jersey was limited to brain-dead or terminal patients, not
someone in Mrs. Conroy's condition.1 83 The New Jersey Su-
174. Id. at 201, 464 N.E.2d at 960.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.
176. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 203, 464 N.E.2d at 961.
177. Id. at 201, 464 N.E.2d at 960.
178. Id. at 208, 464 N.E.2d at 964.
179. Id. at 210, 464 N.E.2d at 965.
180. Simpson, supra note 150, at 14.
181. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
182. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 532, 457 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1983).
183. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 476, 464 A.2d 303, 315 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
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preme Court reversed, ruling that the feeding tube could be re-
moved.' In one of the tests specifically stated, the court noted
that a living will should embody a patient's desire for with-
drawal or withholding of a life-sustaining treatment.'85 This ap-
proach is most significant in the fact that New Jersey is one of
the twelve remaining states without living will legislation.
The Conroy decision has been interpreted by some to be
limited to nursing home residents who are elderly and incompe-
tent, and who have a limited life expectancy.'8 8 Very specific
procedures must be followed and certain tests met. As one com-
mentator has noted:
The Conroy court spoke to cases of nursing home residents
whose mental and physical functioning is severely and perma-
nently impaired, and whose life expectancy is relatively short.
Medical decisions must inevitably be made by some agent on be-
half of such incompetent residents. The social isolation of such
persons, their impairments, and the limited presence of medical
staff all prompted the court to erect significant procedural, as well
as substantive, hurdles to decisions to withdraw life-preserving
treatment. 8 '
A few lower courts have issued opinions on the enforceabil-
ity of living wills. In one Arizona case, the court ordered a hospi-
tal and its employees to stop providing medical treatment
against a patient's will and against the instructions of the pa-
tient's daughter.' 88 The patient had executed a living will while
competent and the court upheld its provisions. 89
1983).
184. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 388, 486 A.2d at 1244.
185. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229.
186. See Comment, Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, 73 GEO. L.J.
1331, 1332 (1985); Note, In re Conroy: A Limited Right to Withhold or Withdraw Artifi-
cial Nourishment, 6 PACE L. REv. 219, 220 (1986).
187. Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 554 (1985).
188. Lurie v, Samaritan Health Serv., No. C510198 (Maricopa County Superior Ct.,
Ariz., 1984).
189. Id.
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C. Current Case Law in New York
New York currently has no living will or natural death stat-
ute. In addition, New York has not yet recognized the substi-
tuted judgment standard which was recommended by the Presi-
dent's Commission and which is presently followed by all other
courts that have addressed the issue. 19
0
However, since Schloendorff,'9' New York has recognized
the common-law right to decline life-saving medical treatment
by imposing civil liability on those who provide medical treat-
ment without consent. In a more recent case, prior to all of the
living will statutes in other states, the New York court upheld
this common-law right in considering the plight of an eighty-
year-old woman whose two sons wanted her physicians to ampu-
tate her gangrenous leg because they believed she would die oth-
erwise. 191 The mother did not want the surgery, and her third
son, who was a physician, opposed the operation as well because
he did not consider the mother's condition terminal.' 93 The
court declined to authorize the operation based upon its respect
for the mother's wishes and its own conclusion that the opera-
tion was not necessary to save her life.'94
In 1977, the New York State Assembly attempted to pass a
living will bill. However, a powerful lobbying effort against the
bill was launched by Right-to-Life groups and several Roman
Catholic organizations. 95 The bill would have permitted an indi-
vidual to make a "living will," directing that life-sustaining pro-
cedures be discontinued if use of such measures would cause loss
of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering, while pro-
viding nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the pa-
tient. 196 The bill was resoundingly defeated, and its sponsors ac-
cused lobbyists of a misinformation campaign that portrayed the
bill as a measure to legalize euthanasia.197 However, after courts
across the country ruled in some similar cases, two representa-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 147-151.
191. Schloendorff v. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
192. In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
193. Id. at 617, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
194. Id. at 623-25, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 630-32.
195. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1977, at B26, col. 1.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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tive Catholic theologians reversed their positions:
Our experience of recent rulings by the Florida (Satz v. Perl-
mutter), Delaware (Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center) and
New York (Eichner v. Dillon) Supreme Courts on the need for
legislative direction on these questions, and the fact that an over-
whelming number of physicians, attorneys and legislators con-
tinue to believe an individual's statement has no legitimacy with-
out a statutory enactment, force us to revise our previous
opposition to this legislation.
With the legislative recognition of the dignity and natural
moral rights of the person and the carefully drawn provisions to
protect those without living wills and to prohibit any form of ac-
tive euthanasia, we find no substantial reason for continued oppo-
sition to living will legislation. Indeed, we believe that the
probability of continued court involvement in this area makes it
prudent to support well-delineated legislation rather than to leave
the determination of patients' rights to the vagaries of conflicting
court rulings." 8
In blood transfusion cases where competent adults have re-
fused treatment based on religious beliefs, the New York courts
have continued to uphold the right of refusal.199 Subsequently,
in In re Lydia E. Hall Hospital,200 a forty-one-year-old compe-
tent patient made a decision to refuse further hemodialysis in
what can only be considered one of the most devastating cases
outlining the multiple life-threatening conditions brought on by
juvenile diabetes, from which this patient suffered for thirty-five
years. The patient had discussed his decision to withdraw from
treatment repeatedly with members of his family and with
priests within the months leading up to his becoming comatose.
The court denied the hospital's petition to continue dialysis,
noting that competent adults have the right of self-determina-
tion and cannot be subjected to medical treatment without their
consent. 0 1
198. Paris & McCormick, supra note 111, at 86-87.
199. See, e.g., Erikson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
200. 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
201. Id. at 488, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 712-13.
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In a landmark New York case, In re Storar,0 2 the court of
appeals refused to accept a right of privacy argument as a basis
for permitting the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment.
Storar consolidated two appellate division cases, In re Storar
and In re Eichner,20 and imposed a clear and convincing evi-
dence standard based upon a common-law right of bodily self-
determination. Addressing Eichner, °4 the court of appeals did
approve the removal of a respirator from eighty-three-year-old
Brother Fox, who had been diagnosed as being in a permanent
vegetative state after surgery. Brother Fox had publicly ex-
pressed the view prior to his surgery, and particularly in light of
the circumstances of the Quinlan case, that he did not want to
be maintained on a life-support system when there was no hope
of recovery.05 The court determined that, based on the clear
and convincing proof of Brother Fox's feelings on the matter,
the priest was entitled, through his guardian, Father Eichner, to
the relief sought.20 6
This same clear and convincing evidence standard was ap-
plied by the court of appeals in addressing the companion case,
In re Storar. °7 However, the court reversed the appellate divi-
sion decision, which had allowed a mother to deprive her incom-
petent child of life-saving blood transfusions. °s Moreover, the
court explicitly rejected both the best interests and substituted
judgment standards,0 9 finding there were no prior statements
available for the court's review since Storar had been incompe-
tent his entire life. The court refused any further exploration of
the substituted judgment rationale and ordered continuation of
the disputed treatment based on the state's parens patriae
power.210
In a recent New York case concerning a woman quadriplegic
202. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
203. The two appellate cases were In re Storar, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46
(4th Dep't 1980) and In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't 1980).
204. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 420 N.E.2d at 66-67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69.
205. Id. at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
206. Id. at 376-80, 420 N.E.2d at 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-74.
207. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
208. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.
210. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
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who was not hospitalized but who characterized her state as a
"living hell,"2" ' the supreme court in Schenectady County held
that it could not grant a patient's request for an order allowing
her to refuse future medical treatment and nourishment in the
absence of an actual and real controversy.2112 In that case, the
court ended its opinion by requesting that the legislature create
some type of special proceeding whereby a person could obtain
an order along the lines sought there by the petitioner.2 1
Perhaps the most important case in terms of future legisla-
tive action is In re Saunders,21 heard by the supreme court in
Nassau County in 1985. Selma Saunders, age seventy, petitioned
the New York court to determine the validity and effectiveness
of a living will which she had executed while living in Pennsylva-
nia. This case is one of the very rare instances in which a specific
living will document has been brought into court for
adjudication.
Saunders was suffering from emphysema and lung cancer
and was confined to her daughter's home in New York.26 Her
condition was described as being "progressive and without cur-
rent known medical cure. '2 16
In April, 1984, Mrs. Saunders had prepared and executed a
living will providing in pertinent part:
"If, due to injury or illness, . . . I become incompetent, and my
condition becomes such that . . . I am in an irreversible coma
... or ... I have been continuously unconscious for a period of
one (1) week . . . or . . . my condition is terminal and hopeless
and death is imminent; then, as of that time, I withdraw my ac-
tual and implied consent to and substitute this REFUSAL of, all
further treatment of me by artificial means and devices.12 1
The State of New York, which had been named as defend-
ant, asserted that there was no justiciable controversy.21 8 How-
ever, the court found that "the underlying issue is of public im-
211. A.B. v. C., 124 Misc. 2d 672, 673, 477 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
212. Id. at 674, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
213. Id. at 676, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
214. 129 Misc. 2d 45, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
215. Id. at 46, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 47, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
218. Id. at 48, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
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portance and is of a recurring nature of a type that is likely to
escape any appropriate court review or determination, because it
reaches the court at a time when it is really too late for the court
to afford any meaningful relief."2 9 Although New York did not
have living will/natural death legislation to enforce in this case,
the court held that such a document is in the nature of an in-
formed medical consent statement which offers sufficiently
"clear and convincing evidence" of a patient's rational and
knowing decision to decline specified medical treatment, and
that no further judicial intervention would be needed for a phy-
sician, health care professional, or institution to act in accord
with the patient's expressed preferences. 220 The court noted par-
ticularly a judicial responsibility to create guideposts, in the ab-
sence of legislation, that will help protect people's interests in
determining the course of their own lives. In a plea to the legis-
lature, Justice McCaffrey stated:
It would, of course, be best if the Legislature formulated
clear standards for resolving requests to terminate life-sustaining
treatment for incompetent patients. As the elected law-making
representatives of the People, the Legislature is better suited and
equipped than any other single institution to reflect the social
value at stake, and it has the resources to collect, compile and
analyze the data and opinions and formulate general guidelines
that may be applicable to a broad range of situations.2 21
D. New York's Interim Experimental Procedure
The New York courts have continued to grapple with the
area of health care decisionmaking. In the case of a once compe-
tent patient who is now incompetent, the court of appeals has
given the legal and medical professions a clearer standard based
on Eichner:222 that each individual's common-law right to decide
upon the course of his or her treatment is paramount to the
physician's determination of the course of treatment, provided
that there is clear and convincing evidence available of that per-
219. Id. at 48, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
220. Id. at 54-55, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
221. Id. at 51-52, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
222. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
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son's wishes during a period when he was competent.
However, the courts have not resolved the issues which pre-
vail in cases where the individual has never been competent and
is now terminally ill. The court of appeals has not recognized a
"substituted judgment" standard, even by court appointed
guardians, as the Storar decision clearly demonstrates.2 2 To
deal with the growing number of incompetent individuals in
similar circumstances, the New York State Assembly passed in-
terim legislation, Article 80 of the Mental Hygiene Law.2 24 This
statute became effective April 1, 1986, and will automatically be
deemed repealed on July 1, 1988.225 Article 80 mandates that the
Commission on Quality Care for the Mentally Disabled conduct
an independent evaluation and assemble a report regarding the
effectiveness of this act, and that its findings be submitted to
the Governor and legislature no later than January 31, 1988.226
The statute provides for the establishment of surrogate
decisionmaking committees to be selected by the Commission.2 27
These committees are utilized to ensure that health care deci-
sions are based on the "best interests" of the patient and reflect
as nearly as possible the patient's own personal beliefs and val-
ues.2 8 In outlining the statutory purpose, the
legislature further finds and declares that the public interest will
be served by the implementation, on a demonstration basis in two
limited geographic areas of the state, of a non-judicial surrogate
decision-making process, which would determine patient capacity
to consent to or refuse medical treatment and assess whether the
proposed treatment promotes the patient's best interests, consis-
tent with the patient's values and preferences.229
There are several drawbacks to this legislation. First, the
"experiment" applies only to patients in state mental hygiene
facilities who lack capacity to consent to or refuse treatment.2 0
223. Id. at 363, 420 N.E.2d at 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
224. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 80.01 to 80.13 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
225. Id. at § 80.01 (note on Effective Date; Expiration; Implementation).
226. Id. at § 80.01 (note on Independent Evaluation; Report to Governor and Legis-
lature).
227. Id. at § 80.05.
228. Id. at § 80.01.
229. Id.
230. Id. at § 80.03(b).
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Secondly, "medical treatment" as defined in the statute specifi-
cally does not include the withdrawal or discontinuance of medi-
cal treatment which is sustaining life functions.2 3' This provision
clearly limits the statute's scope and leaves open the whole ques-
tion of protecting a patient's right to self-determination in such
circumstances. In addition, the bureaucracy necessitated in the
name of protecting the "best interests" of each patient would
appear to defeat the statutory purpose, because most terminally
ill incompetents will have died or been irretrievably placed on
life-support systems by the time the surrogate decisionmaking
committees have made the required determination - particu-
larly since these committees must consist of at least twelve per-
sons in two geographic areas of the state.3 2 These committees
are to operate through panels of four committee members and
an elaborate set of procedures for even the initial decision of
whether or not a patient is in need of surrogate decisionmak-
ing.2 3 Thus far, no cases have been brought under the provi-
sions of Article 80.
Although, in 1985, the New York representative to the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
voted affirmatively to approve the Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act,23 ' New York still has not adopted the model act. In
addition to promoting statutory uniformity in living will laws,
the Act was also designed to provide for "cross-jurisdictional en-
forcement" of such laws. 35 Unfortunately, the Act fails to ad-
dress critical policy concerns regarding treatment given to per-
sons who have not or cannot make their treatment preferences
known - including those who have not made a declaration,
such as a living will, nor those who have always been mentally
disabled.2 36 It also does not address the issue of proxy treatment
decisions. Consequently, in New York, the Attorney General's
opinion cited earlier 23 7 is still the guidepost: although it is not
possible to delegate the authority to another to make health care
231. Id. at § 80.03(a).
232. Id. at § 80.05(a).
233. Id. at § 80.07(a) to (g).
234. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
235. Marzen, supra note 14, at 443.
236. Id. at 444.
237. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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decisions, a power of attorney is a viable instrument to commu-
nicate a health care decision made by a principal. This alterna-
tive is less than satisfactory as the cases indicate. New York is
critically in need of an effective and comprehensive statutory
resolution to the issue of living wills and proxy health care deci-
sionmaking for the elderly and the terminally ill.
V. New York's Legislative Agenda
Perhaps some rationale for New York's failure to make use
of the durable power of attorney for health care decisions is fear,
from a public policy standpoint, of the very considerable power
a durable power of attorney puts into the hands of the attorney-
in-fact. The attorney-in-fact literally has unrestrained use of
those powers which can be implemented to the detriment as well
as to the benefit of the principal. The New York State Assembly
is trying to come to grips with the issue of whether medical deci-
sionmaking is a delegable act, and, if so, whether present stat-
utes in any way preclude the use of the durable power of attor-
ney in this area.
Presently, however, these questions have only come to the
fore in the limited context of "orders not to resuscitate." Despite
the enactment of Article 29-B of the New York Public Health
Law,23 8 many of the crucial issues involving health care decision-
making, particularly for the elderly, continue to fall outside the
narrow scope of such "DNR orders. '239
A. Article 29-B
Article 29-B was enacted on August 7, 1987, and will be-
come effective on April 1, 1988.20 The legislation was one of the
initial recommendations of the Governor's Task Force on Life
and the Law, and was announced as "An Act to amend the pub-
lic health law, in relation to cardiopulmonary resuscitation. 241
Section 2960 outlines the appropriateness of an attending
physician issuing an order not to attempt cardiopulmonary re-
238. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960 to 2978 (McKinney Supp. 1988) (to become
effective on Apr. 1, 1988).
239. DNR stands for "do not resuscitate."
240. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960 to 2978 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
241. Memorandum to N.Y.S. 413, 210th Sess. (1987).
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suscitation ("CPR") of a patient, in certain circumstances,
where the appropriate consent has been obtained.2 2 In addition,
the findings note that the "legislature further finds that there is
a need to clarify and establish the rights and obligations of pa-
tients, their families, and health care providers regarding cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation and the issuance of orders not to re-
suscitate. ' ' 243 Section 2962 establishes the lawfulness of a DNR
order issued by a physician when he has obtained the consent of
the patient, surrogate, parent, or guardian.44 It further specifies
the information which the physician must provide, such as diag-
nosis and prognosis, and risks and benefits of CPR for the pa-
tient, in order to ensure that the consent to a DNR order is truly
informed.2 "
At least one physician designated by the hospital concerned
must concur in the attending physician's determination that the
patient lacks capacity to consent to a DNR order, and such a
determination by both doctors must be recorded in the patient's
medical chart.246 This provision is not unlike many of the living
will/natural death acts that require affirmation by two physi-
cians that a patient is terminally ill. Section 2964, however, en-
ables a competent adult to make a valid, express decision orally
to reject CPR, so long as that declaration is made in the pres-
ence of at least two witnesses who are eighteen years of age or
older, and one of whom is a physician affiliated with a hospital
in which the patient is being treated.2 47 As an alternative, prior
to hospitalization, an individual may execute a written declara-
tion rejecting CPR, so long as the document is dated and signed,
and subscribed to by at least two witnesses who are eighteen
years or older.248
Section 2964 also gives the attending physician discretion-
ary authorization to forego discussion of CPR procedures with a
competent patient and to issue a DNR order if the physician
had determined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
242. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
243. Id.
244. Id. at § 2962(2), (3).
245. Id. at § 2962(3).
246. Id. at § 2963(3).
247. Id. at § 2964(2)(a).
248. Id. at § 2964(2)(b).
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that the patient would suffer immediate and severe injury from
a discussion of CPR.""' When the physician is informed of a pa-
tient's oral or written declaration rejecting CPR, he must record
this information on the patient's medical chart and issue the or-
der, or promptly make his objections known to the patient and
arrange for the transfer of the patient to the care of another
physician, or refer the issue to the dispute mediation system
mandated by this legislation.25
In the situation where the physician, for the patient's wel-
fare, does not discuss CPR and does not obtain prior consent for
a DNR order, he must comply with certain regulations in order
to issue the DNR order: 1) obtaining concurrence of a second
physician; 2) ascertaining the wishes of the patient concerning
CPR to the extent possible; 3) stating on the patient's chart the
reasons for not consulting the patient; and 4) obtaining the con-
sent of a surrogate. 251 The subsequent provisions delineate who
may serve as a surrogate, from one appointed by the patient, to
a wife, adult child, and on down to a close friend.252 The surro-
gate acts on the basis of the adult patient's known wishes, or if
unknown, on the basis of the patient's "best interests. '" 253
Section 2968 clearly stipulates that consent to a DNR order
shall not constitute consent to withhold or withdraw medical
treatment other than cardiopulmonary resuscitation.254 Section
2969 further provides for the automatic right of the patient to
revoke consent to a DNR order at any time, 55 a provision typi-
cal of many living will/natural death acts. One of the seemingly
impractical sections requires a physician to review a DNR order
at least every three days for a patient in a general hospital.256
With the overwhelming increase in the number of geriatric pa-
tients (the highest proportional population increase in the past
ten years has come in the over seventy-five age cohort 257), this
249. Id. at § 2964(3)(a).
250. Id. at § 2964(2)(c)(ii).
251. Id. at § 2964(3)(a)(i), (iv).
252. Id. at § 2965(4)(a)(i)-(vii).
253. Id. at § 2965(5)(a).
254. Id. at § 2968.
255. Id. at § 2969(1).
256. Id. at § 2970(1)(a).
257. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 3, at § 1.7 (lst ed. 1983).
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provision seems unenforceable, even in the most ideal circum-
stances, given the added monitoring responsibility it places on
an already overburdened hospital staff.
The remainder of Article 29-B addresses issues of termi-
nally ill minors and the establishment of dispute mediation sys-
tems in hospitals. Where a dispute is not settled after seventy-
two hours, the proposed statute authorizes the patient, doctor,
or surrogate to seek judicial relief.258 Physicians, nurses, and
hospital employees are immune from civil and criminal liability
for carrying out a DNR order in good faith,259 as are surrogates
or guardians who consent or decline to consent to a DNR
order.2""
Although this law is a step in the right direction in its at-
tempt to bring into harmony often conflicting societal interests
relating to health care, and specifically to DNR decisions, it
leaves many legal issues unanswered. The New York State Bar
Association has initially raised some of the most important is-
sues left open by the enactment of Article 29-B.
B. Response to Article 29-B - Trusts and Estates Law
Section
When Article 29-B was proposed, the New York State Bar
Association (the "Association"), through the Trust and Estates
Law Section and the Committee on Mental and Physical Disa-
bility, urged the Assembly not to enact the law. The Association
noted:
While we recognize that Legislation to establish policy on with-
holding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is an impera-
tive necessity, we nevertheless oppose the Task Force's DNR Bill
firstly, because its piecemeal approach frustrates the objective of
establishing such policy on a uniform basis and secondly, because
even within the limited scope of its stated purpose to clarify
rights and duties regarding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the
Bill fails to accomplish this objective.26
258. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2973(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
259. Id. at § 2974(1).
260. Id. at § 2974(3).
261. Letter from New York State Bar Association to New York State Assembly
Committee on Health and Senate Committee on Health (Jan. 19, 1987) (discussing
problems of N.Y.S. 413 regarding the issuance of Do Not Resuscitate Orders) [hereinaf-
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The Association further criticized the fragmented approach
proposed by the Task Force and alternatively recommended a
policy which would recognize "that the same principles apply to
withholding and withdrawing all manner of life-sustaining treat-
ment." 62 In citing the need for two separate policies (one to as-
sure that decisions by competent adults are given effect and a
second to fill the "decisionmaking vacuum '' 26 in which persons
under a legal disability find themselves), the Association recom-
mended a single form of consent or instructions that would be
applicable to all forms of treatment declined by (or on behalf of)
a patient - thereby avoiding separate procedural mechanisms
for consent in every type of treatment situation.2 6
In promoting patient autonomy, the Association was most
critical of the law's provisions concerning dispute mediation pro-
cedures. During the seventy-two hour waiting period, the com-
mon-law right of a competent adult to determine the course of
his/her own medical treatment is suspended.26 Further, during
that period, if a cardiac arrest situation arises, CPR procedures
are mandated.26 If the individual is placed on a respirator dur-
ing that time, no authority exists to withdraw what may have
clearly been unwanted treatment, without judicial interven-
tion.2 " The Association stated that there is "good reason to be-
lieve that this restriction would be found by the courts to violate
constitutionally protected rights of patients. '2 8 Additionally,
the Minority Report of the Governor's Task Force clearly noted
that this legislation is founded on the presumption that" 'all pa-
tients, in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest consent to the
provision of CPR.' ",269 Yet, there were no cases and no statutes
in New York that established such a presumption. The response
of the Association concluded that adopting such a premise
would clearly result in the administration of medically futile
ter Bar Association Letter].
262. Id. at 2.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2-3.
265. Id. at 5.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 6.
269. Id. at 7.
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CPR procedures where they have not been used previously.
Such actions acutely affect the rights of the elderly infirm.
The New York State Bar Association and the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York jointly submitted draft health
care decisionmaking legislation as an alternative to Article 29-B.
Their proposal would have provided a broader statutory frame-
work for such decisionmaking by competent adults. 71 This draft
legislation called for a two-part approach to the problem - one
implementing advance directives to take effect when an individ-
ual becomes terminally ill, and the other initiating a proxy
health care decisionmaking process through the use of a special
power of attorney.2 71
Ironically, the bar associations had been willing to leave
open the question of decisionmaking by life-long incompetents,
and have deferred instead to the eventual report assessing the
impact of Article 80 of the Mental Hygiene Law. 73 They expect
to file recommendations for establishing a uniform policy in this
area once sufficient information has been yielded by the Mental
and Physical Disabilities Committee. 74
The Association had recommended that Article 29-B be
abandoned, and that in its place, the legislature adopt living
wills as a vehicle to preserve individual autonomy in conjunc-
tion with special health care decision proxies. It is clear that the
Association has been recommending the delegation of authority
with respect to health care decisions through the use of a sepa-
rate instrument, rather than by incorporating such a delegation
in the statutory short form durable power of attorney. However,
the draft legislative alternative realizes that many individuals
and their counsel will wish to include both living wills and
health care decision proxies in the same instrument and ex-
pressly authorizes such inclusion. 76 Most of the recommenda-
270. Id. at 8.
271. Memorandum in Support of Health Care Decisions Legislation at 1 (Apr. 30,
1986) (submitted to the New York State Legislature by the New York State Bar Associa-
tion and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York) (available from the New
York State Bar Association) [hereinafter Bar Association Memorandum].
272. Id.
273. Bar Association Letter, supra note 261, at 3-4. See also supra notes 224-233
and accompanying text.
274. Bar Association Letter, supra note 261, at 4.
275. Bar Association Memorandum, supra note 271, at 6-7.
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tions made by the Association are drawn from the Uniform
Rights of Terminally Ill Act. It is only in this context that the
Association foresees the common law right to self-determination
being preserved.
C. The Goodhue Proposal
In March, 1987, New York State Senator Mary Goodhue in-
troduced a bill to make living wills legally binding instruments
in New York State.2 6 However, the bill was withdrawn in June
1987 in response to two factors: 1) lack of sufficient time remain-
ing in the legislative session to win support for the bill2 "7 and 2)
substantial opposition from several senators as well as the New
York State Catholic Conference, the lobbying group for the Ro-
man Catholic Church. 78 The primary objection to the bill de-
rived from its provision that an advance directive may, at the
discretion of the declarant, expressly provide for the withholding
of nutrition and hydration. 7 9 It is clear that within the medical
and political arenas, there is broader consensus about DNR or-
ders than about withdrawing life support systems. 8 '
The Goodhue Bill contained many provisions similar to the
Louisiana Natural Death Act.2 81 For example, an eligible declar-
ant who is making a living will must be eighteen years of age or
older and must be competent at the time the directive is exe-
cuted. 82 In addition, two physicians must have personally ex-
amined the patient and certified in writing that he is in a termi-
nal condition.283  One of these must be the attending
276. N.Y.S. 4525-A, 201 Sess. (1987).
277. The Daily Argus (Gannett Westchester Newspapers), June 18, 1987, at A21,
col. 5.
278. Letter from Rev. Kenneth J. Doyle, Director of Government Relations for the
New York State Catholic Conference, to the Honorable Members of the New York State
Senate (June 1, 1987) (discussing the Catholic Conference's opposition to the Goodhue
Bill, N.Y.S. 4525-A).
279. N.Y.S. 4525-A, 201 Sess. (1987).
280. Miller, Making Life-and-Death Decisions, Newsday, June 30, 1987, at 62, col.
1. (Tracey E. Miller is executive director of the New York State Task Force on Life and
Law.).
281. See supra note 128-129 and accompanying text.
282. N.Y.S. 4525-A, at § 4601(3).
283. Id.
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physician.2 84
All of the usual formalities for executing a testamentary dis-
position in New York are incorporated into this living will bill.2 85
Further, the subscribing witnesses may not be a spouse, blood
relative, attending physician or his employee, an employee of
any health facility in which the declarant is a patient, or anyone
with a claim against the declarant's estate.286 The Goodhue Bill
also included a provision that is new to many sister state acts: if
the declarant is a patient in a nursing home, he or she must have
a patient advocate or ombudsman designated by the Office on
Aging as one of the two subscribing witnesses. 28 7 The majority of
remaining provisions are common to other living will statutes,
including those which outline the declarant's responsibility to
notify the attending physician of the declaration's existence, 288 a
disclaimer of pregnancy, 189 revocation procedures, 290 immunity
from criminal or civil liability for physicians and health care
professionals acting pursuant to a living will directive,291 and the
imposition of penalties.292
One of the uncommon provisions is the recognition of living
will directives executed in other states.2 93 By far, the most con-
troversial section deals with the declarant's ability to direct that
artificial life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn,
including procedures to accomplish the purpose of nutrition and
hydration.294 Those opposing the Goodhue Bill have focused
particularly on this provision, characterizing it as one that would
jeopardize the lives of certain individuals. 25 The New York
State Catholic Conference has stated:
Our Conference does not believe that every possible medical
treatment must be used to prolong life, particularly when the
284. Id. at § 4602(1)(b).
285. Id. at § 4602(2).
286. Id.
287. Id. at § 4603.
288. Id. at § 4602(3).
289. Id. at § 4602(4)(c).
290. Id. at § 4604(1).
291. Id. at § 4609.
292. Id. at § 4610(1)-(3).
293. Id. at § 4614.
294. Id. at § 4602(5).
295. Letter of Rev. Kenneth J. Doyle, supra note 278, at para. 3.
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treatment itself is excessively burdensome and offers little hope
of benefit. However, nutrition and hydration in most cases do not
constitute medical treatment - instead they normally represent
minimal means of ordinary human care which one individual
owes to another.
Nutrition meets a basic need of all human beings, a need
which is not specifically medical. Moreover, to remove nutrition
and hydration is to bring about death directly. When medical
treatment is removed - as in the celebrated Karen Quinlan
case - a patient may or may not die. But when nutrition and
hydration are removed, that removal causes death surely and
soon.
2 96
The Goodhue Bill was also set aside in an attempt to allow
the Governor's Task Force on Life and Law to gather and report
its findings, which have centered upon an evaluation of the ethi-
cal and legal issues inherent in living will legislation and the ter-
mination of life support systems. The Task Force made its rec-
ommendation public in September of 1987.297 Competent adults
should be allowed to designate a proxy for health care decisions,
whether such decisions are routine or "life and death. 29 8 Health
care providers who honor such decisions would be immune from
both civil and criminal liability, while failure to honor them
could result in civil penalties.2 99 Physicians declining to comply
with the decisions must refer the patient to other physicians or
hospitals. 300 The proposed legislation will be introduced in the
New York State Assembly in January 1988 by Richard N. Gott-
fried of Manhattan, the chairman of the Assembly Health Com-
mittee, and the bill is not expected to receive significant
opposition.0
Ironically, while the Goodhue proposal was before the New
York State Legislature, a case involving the withdrawal of nutri-
tion and hydration was presented in the appellate division, sec-
ond department,302 appealing a judgment of the New York Su-
296. Id. at para. 4, 5.
297. Sullivan, New York Panel Urges Widening Patients' Rights, N.Y. Times, Sept.
30, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
298. Id. at B3, col. 2.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at B3, col. 3.
302. In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987).
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preme Court, Westchester County.0 3 In In re Delio, the wife of
a thirty-three year old patient who was in a chronic vegetative
state with no hope of recovery petitioned to terminate the pa-
tient's care. The hospital in which the patient was confined op-
posed the application on the grounds that discontinuation of nu-
trition and hydration was contrary to the hospital's ethical and
moral standards." 4 The supreme court denied the petition, 30 5
and the wife appealed. The appellate division held that the wife,
as conservator of the patient, was entitled to act in accordance
with prior clearly expressed wishes of the patient and to have
the use of feeding and hydration tubes discontinued;306 the ap-
pellate division thereby granted the petition.
Although Daniel Delio was only thirty-three, his condition
was not unlike that of many elderly patients. During the course
of a routine surgical procedure, Delio suffered cardiac arrest
with resulting severe and irreversible brain damage.30 7 Although
he was able to breathe spontaneously and did not require the
assistance of a respirator, he could not chew food or voluntarily
swallow.30 8 Nutrition and hydration were therefore provided to
him by means of two artificial devices surgically inserted in his
stomach and small intestines.30 9
When the lower court denied Julianne Delio's application to
withdraw the surgically inserted feeding tubes, it noted that
"placing a judicial imprimatur on a decision to terminate the
care in this case, in the absence of clear legislative or judicial
guidance, is fraught with danger."31 The appellate division
chose to apply the same clear and convincing standard that the
court of appeals had utilized in the Eichner and Storar deci-
sions.3 11 Although Delio had not executed a living will, the ap-
pellate division was cognizant of the substantial testimony
presented at the hearing in the lower court and stated:
303. In re Delio, 134 Misc. 2d 1106, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
304. In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d 1, 4, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (2d Dep't 1987).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693-94.
307. Id. at 3, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
308. Id. at 3, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
309. Id. at 3-4, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
310. In re Delio, 134 Misc. 2d 206, 214-15, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415, 420 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 202-210.
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While we are painfully aware of the responsibility which we un-
dertake in reaching a determination in this matter, we are aided
in our determination by the clear and convincing evidence
presented at the hearing before the trial court that the patient for
whom the application to withdraw medical treatment is made
would, if competent, have rejected nutrition and hydration by ar-
tificial means and, in effect, would have chosen to allow the
processes of nature to take their course. 12
The hospital's argument centered upon its distinction be-
tween a respirator, which it characterized as " 'extraordinary
medical care' and nutrition, arguing that the common law right
of bodily self-determination should be confined to the for-
mer."313 Citing the Conroy31 and Brophy31 5 cases, the court re-
jected the hospital's differentiation between feeding by artificial
means and other forms of medical treatment. Although noting
certain differences between the two, the court concluded:
We agree with those courts' decisions that the withdrawal or
withholding of feeding by artificial means should be evaluated in
the same manner as any other medical procedure. In this respect,
we view nutrition and hydration by artificial means as being the
same as the use of a respirator or other form of life support
equipment.816
Without the force of law, cases such as Daniel Delio's will
continue to be pressed in the courts. One observer in this partic-
ular case noted that if Delio had executed a living will that was
legally enforceable in New York, the family might have been
able to shorten or avoid altogether the initial part of the
case - that phase in which the petitioner had to prove that
Delio would not have wanted to be kept alive by artificial feed-
ing tubes.31 7
312. In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d at 3, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
313. Id. at 16, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
314. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
315. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
316. In re Delio, 129 A.D.2d at 19, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (citation omitted).
317. Lane, A Will to Live . . .or to Die, The Daily Argus (Gannett Westchester
Newspapers), June 3, 1987, at A12, col. 3.
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VI. Practical Implementation for the Practitioner
The primary task for the practitioner in dealing with elderly
clients is the need to resolve, on a case-by-case basis, the ongo-
ing tension between autonomy and paternalism. Guardianship
and conservatorship are not panaceas for the elderly person who
is more likely to be partially rather than totally incapacitated or
disabled. As one respected advocate for the aging has noted,
"these procedures may be responsible for stripping the elderly
person of his last measure of dignity and self-esteem." '18
A growing concern for the practitioner should be sensitivity
and vigilance toward elderly clients in terms of apprising them
of alternatives to guardianship and general conservatorship. The
attorney's primary role should encompass counseling and actions
that will assist the client to retain autonomy and control over
person and property. The durable power of attorney has been
the single, most rapidly adopted mechanism for achieving these
goals. 19 For the practitioner working with elderly clients, it has
been the most practical and least expensive alternative to tradi-
tional protective services.
The court, in Saunders, recommended the use of a limited
durable power of attorney to delegate decisionmaking. 2 ° How-
ever, the court was also quick to note the "catch-22" circum-
stances brought about by such an instrument. In using this de-
vice, the principal is giving over to a third party the power to
determine what kind and extent of care is to be provided in life-
threatening situations. This is exactly what Mrs. Saunders
sought to avoid since the purpose of her living will was to main-
tain her right to self-determination.2 1
Despite the fact that the legislature has not yet adopted liv-
ing will legislation, clients should be encouraged to make a living
will declaration. Then, in the event such circumstances arrive
and the client is incompetent, the living will can be brought to
light as clear and convincing evidence of the client's wishes. The
living will should include a durable power of attorney by which
an individual can designate some other person as his legal
318. J. KRAUSKOPF, supra note 3, at § 6.1 (1st ed. 1983).
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 214-221 and accompanying text.
321. In re Saunders, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 53, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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guardian for questions concerning medical treatment.3 22 It
should be noted that even if the legislature resurrects the Good-
hue proposal, there is no provision in the bill for the appoint-
ment of an agent for medical decisionmaking.
Even if New York adopts specific legislation, clients ought
to be encouraged to use the living will declaration in order to
make specific and personalized directives. For example, when
discussing what extraordinary life-sustaining procedures the cli-
ent would not like to endure, he or she should clearly mention
that he does not want to be placed on a respirator or dialysis or
to be fed in any other way than by mouth. Incorporating such
specific provisions will eliminate potential disputes over what
the client actually meant when vague terms have been used.
In addition, trusts and estates specialists have recom-
mended that the durable power of attorney be used as a sepa-
rate instrument, delegating authority to communicate health
care decisions exclusively. 23 However, the lawyer must empha-
size to the client the importance of careful selection of an attor-
ney-in-fact based on the sweeping nature of the powers that are
transferred. In the case of the elderly client who often appoints
his or her elderly spouse as attorney-in-fact, the client should be
advised to appoint a back-up agent to prepare for the possibility
of an attorney-in-fact predeceasing the incapacitated spouse
principal.
Both the living will and the limited durable power of attor-
ney for these circumstances ought to be notarized and witnessed
by disinterested parties (those who are not blood relatives and
are not beneficiaries of the person's estate). From there, it is in-
cumbent upon the attorney and client to ensure that both docu-
ments become part of that client's medical records in the appro-
priate physician's office. For the practitioner working with
elderly clients, the living will declaration and the durable power
of attorney should become part of the normal estate planning
discussions between attorney and client - at least until such
time as the legislature has acted in this area.
322. A sample living will may be obtained from Concern for Dying, 250 West 57th
Street, New York, N.Y. 10107.
323. Note, supra note 39.
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VII. Conclusion
Using advance directives, whether a living will, durable
power of attorney, or specific appointment of an agent for health
care decisions (via a limited durable power of attorney) may
eliminate the need for conservators and committees. The Presi-
dent's Commission echoed the concern over the cumbersomeness
and costs of legal guardianship.2  It noted that these factors
strongly militate against legal guardianship and ought to be
taken into account by lawmakers before they require that deci-
sions about life-sustaining treatment be made by judicially ap-
pointed guardians.32 5 Given the demographics in New York
State concerning the number of elderly who may find themselves
in these circumstances over the next ten to twenty years, the
court system could not withstand the demands that such proce-
dures would place upon it.
In addition to time and money, court proceedings place the
family and the patient under enormous emotional stress at an
already difficult time by making public what should essentially
be a private matter. The Delio case is one striking example
among many. Although many of the living will statutes were
designed to make such documents legally binding, the resulting
laws are so restrictive in some instances that their effectiveness
is impaired.2 Although the DNR statute is a breakthrough, its
scope is limited to the final circumstances in an individual's
life - situations in which that individual very often has little
control. Appointing an agent for medical care decisions in the
future by means of a durable power of attorney, standing alone,
also has an uncertain legal status. Although New York has
leaned on the common-law right to self-determination, it is diffi-
cult to place great reliance on such common-law rights. After all,
if the common law had unequivocally established such rights,
there would be no need for the statutes.
Within the legislature, lawmakers have the ability to delib-
erate and seek input from all segments of the medical and legal
communities. As Judge McCaffrey noted in his plea during the
Saunders case, the legislature is eminently better suited than a
324. DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT, supra note 21, at 130.
325. Id. at 131.
326. Capron, supra note 143.
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court to address these issues. 27 The DNR law is not a final an-
swer - it has merely opened the door ever so slightly on a
much larger set of issues. It behooves the New York Legislature
to review and adopt the alternative legislation proposed by the
bar associations advocating the combined use of living will dec-
larations and health care decision proxies - at least until some
greater, perfecting piece of legislation is forthcoming. The legis-
lature has an ethical and moral responsibility, particularly to the
growing elderly population in New York State, to preserve their
right to self-determination before that right is forever lost in the
morass of bureaucracy.
327. In re Saunders, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 54, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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